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Judicial independence is predicated on "good faith"
decision-making. It was never intended to include "bad faith"
decision-making, where a judge knowingly and deliberately disregards
the facts and law of a case. This is properly the subject of
disciplinary review, irrespective of whether it is correctable on
appeal. And egregious error also constitutes misconduct, since
its nature and/or magnitude presuppose that a judge acted
willfully, or that he is incompetent.
Editors' note: This article is a critique of
the judicial discipline system which should be aired.
Publication of the critique does not constitute an endorsement
of the Center for Judicial Accountability's claims about particular
cases.
The most
serious misconduct by judges is that which is the least likely to
subject them to discipline. It is not what they do in their
private lives, off the bench, but what they do on the bench in the
course of litigation. The obvious image is the judge who runs
his courtroom as if he owns it, who looks down from his elevated
bench and treats litigants and their attorneys in an imperious and
abusive fashion. But even where a judge is, as he is supposed
to be, patient and dignified in demeanor, every court appearance,
just like every written motion, involves a judge ruling on a
procedural or substantive aspect of a case. And there are
judges who, while presenting a veneer of fairness, are
intellectually dishonest. They make rulings and decisions
which are not only a gross abuse of discretion, but which knowingly
and deliberately disregard "clear and controlling law" and
obliterate , distort, or fabricate the facts in the record to do
so.
Why
would a judge be intellectually dishonest? He may be
motivated by undisclosed bias due to personal or political
interest. Judicial selection processes are politically
controlled and closed, frequently giving us judges who are better
connected than they are qualified. And once on the bench,
these judges reward their friends and punish their enemies.
Although ethical codes require judges to disclose facts bearing upon
their impartiality, they don't always do so. They sit on cases
in which they have undisclosed relationships with parties, their
attorneys, or have interested in the outcome, and do so deliberately
because they wish to advantage either one side over another or
sometimes themselves.
They
exercise their wide discretion in that side's favor. That's
the side for whom deadlines are flexible and for whom procedural
standards and evidentiary rules don't apply. A common thread
running through judicial misconduct cases is litigation misconduct
by the favored side. Meanwhile, the other side struggles to
meet inflexible deadlines, and has its worthy motions denied.
In extreme cases, a judicial process predicated on standards of
conduct, elementary legal principles, rules of evidence, simply
ceases to exist.
INTELLECTUAL DISHONESTY
Every case has many
facts, any of which may be inadvertently "misstated" in judicial
decisions. But judicial misconduct is not about innocent
"misstatement" of facts, and certainly not about peripheral
facts. It involves a judge's knowing and deliberate
misrepresentation of the material facts on which the case
pivots. These facts determine the applicable law. If the
applicable law doesn't allow the judge to do what he wants to do,
he's going to have to change the material facts so that the law
doesn't apply. When judges don't want to put themselves on
record as dishonestly reciting facts, they just render decisions
without reasons or factual findings.
The
prevalence of intellectually dishonest decisions is described by
Northwestern Law Professor Anthony D'Amato in "The Ultimate
Injustice: When the Court Misstates the Facts." He
shows how judges at different levels of the state and federal
systems manipulate the facts and the law to make a case turn out the
way they want it to. D'Amato quotes from a speech by Hofstra
Law Professor Monroe Freedman to a conference of federal
judges:
"Frankly, I have had
more than enough of judicial opinions that bear no relationship
whatsoever to the cases that have been filed and argued before the
judges. I am talking about judicial opinions that falsify
the facts of the cases that have been argued, judicial opinions
that make disingenuous use or omission of material authorities,
judicial opinions that cover up these things with no-publication
and and no-citation rules."(1)
Afterward, when Professor Freedman sat down, a judge
sitting next to him turned to him and said, "You don't know the half
of it."
THE MYTH OF RECUSALS
There's next to
nothing you can do when you're before a dishonest judge. He's
not going to respond to a recusal motion with "Hallelujah, you've
shown me the light. I'll step down." His dishonesty will
carry through to the recusal motion, which, while asserting his
complete fairness and impartiality, he will deny from the bench,
with no written decision or, if by a written decision, then one
stating no reasons or misstating the basis for recusal. And
just as making a formal recusal motion entails expense, as any
motion does, so does taking an interim appeal, which may not be
feasible.
Of
course, there's a problem even before making a recusal motion.
Your lawyer may not want to make one because it means taking on the
judge by accusing him of biased conduct. A lawyer's ethical
duty is to zealously represent each client, but lawyers have other
clients whose cases may come before that judge. And it is not
just their relationship with that judge that they want to protect,
but with his judicial brethren, who are part of the judge's circle
of friends and may be quite defensive of his honor, which they see
as an extension of their own.
Congress has
passed two specific recusal statutes proscribing judicial bias and
conflict of interest by federal judges. These have been gutted
by the federal judiciary. One statute explicitly states that
whenever a party files a "timely and sufficient affidavit that the
judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias or
prejudice either against him or in favor of an adverse party, such
judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be
assigned to hear such proceeding..." It seems pretty clear on
its face. Yet the federal courts have interpreted this
to mean that the judge who is the subject of the recusal affidavit
determines its timeliness and sufficiency. The result is
predictable. The complained-of judge then acts as a censor,
ruling that a timely and sufficient affidavit is untimely and/or
insufficient so as to prevent its being heard on the merits by
another judge.
On
top of that, the federal courts had interpreted the recusal statutes
to require that the basis for recusal be "extrajudicial." This
means that the facts giving rise to recusal can't come from the case
itself, but from something outside the case. Thus, if the
basis of the recusal motion is that the judge has been oppressive,
bullying, and insulting, has willfully disregarded black-letter law
and falsified the factual record - in other words, that he has
engaged in all the misconduct properly believed to be biased - that
judge need not step down when a recusal motion is made. The
litigant or his lawyer has the impossible burden of trying to ferret
out information about the judge's personal, professional, and
political life so as to figure out the "why" behind the egregious
misconduct. Parenthetically, the U.S. Supreme Court, having
long ago generated the "extrajudicial" source doctrine out of thin
air, has implicitly approved a pervasive bias" exception to
it. This, of course, means nothing to a biased judge, who will
pretend he is unable to discern any bias, let alone
"pervasive bias."
THE CHIMERA OF JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINE
You would think
that where a judge consistently abuses his discretion and renders
dishonest rulings, including on recusal motions, a formal judicial
misconduct complaint would be taken seriously by a disciplinary
body. Each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia has a
commission, committee, council, or review board, whose purpose is to
address complaints of judicial misconduct by state judges within its
jurisdiction. There is also a mechanism for complaints against
federal judges, which is set forth at 28 U.S.C. subsec.
872(c). Because it was enacted by Congress in 1980, it is
commonly called "the 1980 Act."
These disciplinary mechanisms frequently dismiss,
out-of-hand, complaints of on-the-bench misconduct, including
abusive courtroom behavior and fabricated judicial decisions.
They do this on the pretense that they have no authority to review
the "merits of matters within a judge's discretion, such as the
rulings and decisions in a particular case," which they assert can
only be reviewed by an appeal to an appellate court. The
theory here is that doing otherwise infringes upon judicial
independence, the important principle that judges be free to decide
cases based on the facts before them and applicable law, without
outside pressure and influences. However, judicial
independence is predicated on "good faith" decision-making. It
was never intended to include "bad-faith" decision-making, where a
judge knowingly and deliberately disregards the facts and law of a
case. This is properly the subject of disciplinary review,
irrespective of whether it is correctable on appeal. And
egregious error also constitutes misconduct, since its nature and/or
magnitude presuppose that a judge acted willfully, or that he is
incompetent.
Under the 1980
Act, one of the statutory grounds upon which a Chief Judge may
dismiss a judicial misconduct complaint is if he finds it to be
"directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural
ruling." Although a complaint alleging bad-faith, biased
judicial conduct - including legally insupportable and factually
dishonest rulings - should not be dismissed as "merits-related," it
invariably is. Adding insult to injury, Chief Judges sometimes
take onto their dismissal orders another statutory ground for
dismissal, "frivolousness." In their view, a bias claim
supported only by erroneous rulings and decisions, no
matter how egregious, is "frivolous".
THE ILLUSORY REMEDY OF APPEAL
Faced with a dishonest judge, litigants often cave in
at the trial level and never make it to appeal. It's too
emotionally and financially draining to continue before a biased and
dishonest judge. This is not to say that justice is obtainable
on appeal. Even with a reversal, the onus of the appeal is on
the aggrieved litigant, who, at best, gets what he was entitled to
at the outset, only years later after spending untold amounts of
money on legal fees and costs. Beyond that, the appellate
decision, if it even identifies the "error" as judicial misconduct,
will likely minimize it. Notwithstanding their ethical duty,
appellate judges rarely, if ever, take steps to refer an errant
trial judge for disciplinary action. And this is where the
appellate process "works"!
In the federal
system and in most state systems, you get only one appeal as of
right. After that it's at a higher court's option. And
what happens when you file misconduct complaints against appellate
judges for their dishonest decisions? Just like the dishonest
decisions of trial judges, they'll be tossed out as "merits
related."
THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL
DISCIPLINE AND REMOVAL
Created by Congress, the National Commission on
Judicial Discipline and Removal was supposed "to investigate and
study the problems and issues" relating to judicial discipline and
removal in the federal system and to evaluate more effective
alternatives. In August 1993, it issued a report concluding
that existing mechanisms were sufficient to deal with misconduct by
federal judges. All that was necessary was a little
tinkering. With that, at a cost to taxpayers of nearly
$1,000,000, the Commission passed out of existence, indefinitely
setting back the cause of meaningful judicial
reform.
How did the
Commission reach its conclusions? Not by making any
significant outreach to those having direct, first-hand experience
with the key "problems and issues," most of it dodged. Indeed
the Commission's researchers never interviewed anyone who had filed
a judicial misconduct complaint with the federal judiciary under the
1980 Act or with Congress to initiate its impeachment
procedures. How can you make any assessment about how these
mechanisms are working unless you reach out to the victims of
judicial misconduct who have used them? Yet the researchers
who reviewed subsec. 372(c) complaints were not ashamed to admit,
"We know little about complainants and what they seek. We did
not design this research to address those issues."(2) This
admission is buried deep within their underlying research
study.
Instead, the Commission's researchers interviewed
Circuit Chief Judges and Circuit Executives about their experience
in administering the 1980 Act. And how did the Chief Judges
explain the value of the 1980 Act when 95% of the complaints filed
were dismissed, mostly on the statutory ground that they were
"merits-related"? They made claims about how the Act served as
a deterrent to misconduct, and that "informal" discipline was taking
place behind the scenes, using phrases like "still water runs
deep." The judges insisted on absolute anonymity and that
their comments be camouflaged to prevent them from being traced back
to their Circuit. The Commission gave scant recognition that
judge's responses might be tainted by
self-interest.
The judge's
anonymous comments cannot be verified, nor can the Commission's
conclusions about the judicial misconduct complaints it
reviewed. This is because the complaints are inaccessible to
the public.
The Commission's report fails to say that it was the
federal judiciary which made subsec. 372(c) complaints confidential
- not Congress - and does not explore how this has frustrated
Congress' ability to exercise the "vigorous oversight" it promised
when it passed the 1980 Act. There were fears that the federal
judiciary would be unwilling to police itself. Yet not only
does the report not alert Congress to its prerogative to amend the
subsec. 372(c) statute to ensure public access to complaints, but
the Commission allowed the federal judiciary to undermine what was
supposed to be the first real evaluation of the 1980 Act. It
did this by permitting the federal judiciary to dictate the strict
terms under which it would allow the Commission to review a sampling
of subsec. 372(c) complaints: only designated
court-researchers could review them. The Commission should
have objected, strenuously, so that the complaints could be
independently reviewed by outside individuals. Instead, it
capitulated to judicial interests, which were heavily represented on
the Commission. As a result, its report is not based on a
truly independent review of complaints filed under the 1980
Act.
As for
complaints filed with Congress and referred to the House Judiciary
Committee, the Commission's report states they "may be made
available upon request." Quoting the report as authority, the
Center for Judicial Accountability asked to examine the very
complaints the Commission's researchers had reviewed. We were
told that we would be notified when the Committee's policy for
reviewing past complaints "was decided." That was more
than two years ago and we're still waiting for word of
the Committee's policy.
The House Judiciary Committee fully participated in
the Commission's report. The list of members and counsel from
the House Judiciary Committee involved in the Commission's work
reads like a Who's Who. Its courts subcommittee held
a hearing on the Commission's draft report. The natural
assumption is that the report would be extremely accurate about the
House Judiciary Committee's procedures. But accuracy would
have exposed the Committee's dereliction.
The shameful
facts about the House Judiciary Committee's operations are cut from
the Commission's report. You see this when you compare it with
the draft report that preceded it, and then compare them to the
underlying research studies. The report depicts the House
Judiciary Committee as professional and responsive. But a
wholly different picture emerges when you turn back to the
underlying research studies. Even the draft report discloses
that over 80% of the complaints reviewed by the researcher had not
even been responded to by the House Judiciary Committee. That
statistic is gone from the final report. Likewise cut from the
final report is the draft's statement that "well over 90% of the
complaints [filed with the House Judiciary Committee] do not raise
genuine issues pertinent to judicial discipline and
impeachment." That means up to 10% do raise such issues.
The obvious next question is what the House Judiciary Committee did
with these serious complaints. The draft report doesn't have
the answer. You have to turn back to an underlying study to
find out that the Committee either did not respond to these
complaints or, if it had, did nothing beyond
that.
THE FAILURE OF THE 1980 ACT
Because the House Judiciary Committee does not
investigate individual complaints, the 1980 Act is the only avenue
for disciplining the federal judges. Yet the vast majority of
complaints are dismissed on the Act's statutory ground that they are
"directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural
ruling." The Commission's report does not disclose this
important fact.
Plainly, for
Congress to exercise "vigorous oversight" over the federal
judiciary's administration of the Act, which is what the Commission
was supposed to facilitate, it needed to know how the federal
judiciary was interpreting "merit-relatedness." This was all
the more essential because the federal judiciary had made judicial
misconduct complaints confidential. Most importantly, was the
federal judiciary treating complaints alleging bias, including
dishonest decisions, as "merits-related" complaints, but only that
such complaints "may" be dismissed, Congress needed to know what
factors the federal judiciary was considering in exercising its
discretion.
Yet, the two paragraphs of the Commission's 150-page
report devoted to "merits-relatedness" make it utterly impossible
for Congress or anyone else to discern how the federal judiciary has
interpreted that statutory ground or exercised its discretion.
The first paragraph concedes confusion as to the relationship
between "merits-relatedness" and an appellate remedy, which may or
may not exist. The second paragraph then tries to minimize the
fact that even where there is no appellate remedy, "merits-related"
complaints are dismissed. It trumpets that the "core reason"
for excluding such complaints from disciplinary review is "to
protect the independence of the judicial officer in making
decisions, not to promote or protect the appellate process... " But
this is rhetoric. "The independence of the judicial officer"
does not extend to bad-faith conduct, including decisions motivated
by bias or other illegitimate purposes. And disciplinary
review is appropriate under such circumstances, whether or not there
is an appellate remedy.
Not only did the
Commission fail to articulate this appropriate standard, but the
researchers did as well. Three of the Commission's separate
underlying research studies quote from a 1987 memo by Patricia Wald,
then Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, to Judge Elmo Hunter, who had
been instrumental in developing the 1980 Act and was then chairman f
the Court Administration Committee of the Judicial Conference, the
federal judiciary's "top management":
Since the vast majority of complaints we receive
come out of judicial proceedings, some clarification... would be
helpful. Is anything that arose in the course of a
proceeding out of bounds for a complaint, or is behavior that
might have been appealed as a fundamental deprivation of due
process (i.e., the lack of an unbiased judge) still a permissible
subject of a complaint?
Where is the
answer to Judge Wald's straight-forward question? The researchers,
including those who had interviewed Chief Judges, do not refer to
any answer from Judge Hunter or any other judge. Nor do they
provide their own answer. How could the federal judiciary
properly and consistently address subsec. 372(c) complaints if it
was unable to answer that question 13 years after the
passage of the 1980 Act?
The obvious conclusion, which the Commission chose to
ignore and conceal, is that the federal judiciary had deliberately
left the "merits-related" category vague in order to dump virtually
every judicial misconduct complaint it receives. This is clear
from the circuits' failure to develop and publish a body of
decisional law relative to the 1980 Act, despite a 1986
recommendation by the Judicial Conference that it do
so.
DIRECT, FIRST-HAND EXPERIENCE
The dishonesty
of the National Commission is further exposed by the direct,
first-hand experience of CJA and its personnel. Back in June
1993, when the commission issued its draft report, purportedly for
public comment, we responded to its conclusory claims that the
appellate process constituted a "fundamental check" of judicial
misconduct, as did "peer disapproval" among judges. To rebut
such claims, we provided it with the appellate record of a case in
which a district judge's factually-fabricated and legally
insupportable decision was affirmed by a circuit court panel.
Although the panel's decision rested on non-existent facts and was,
on its face, aberrant, contradictory, and violated black-letter law
of the circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court, attempts to obtain
discretionary review by the full circuit and in the Supreme Court
were futile.
We
pointed out to the Commission that its draft report, expressing
confidence in the formal mechanisms for discipline in the judicial
branch, had stated that it would not recommend substantial change
"absent a convincing demonstration of the inadequacy of the 1980
Act." We asked the Commission directly whether a complaint
against the judicial authors of those fraudulent and lawless
decisions were reviewable under the 1980 Act. If not, then
there was no remedy in the judicial branch and the case should be
designated by the Commission as providing the required "convincing
demonstration" for a recommendation of more substantive
changes.
But the Commission refused to answer whether such a
complaint would be reviewable under the Act and directed us to seek
review by the House Judiciary Committee. Three weeks later,
the House Judiciary Committee's counsel - who was also its liaison
to the National Commission - told us that "there has never been an
investigation of an individual complaint in the history of the House
Judiciary Committee," and that we shouldn't expect to start
now. It was then August 1993 and the Commission's final report
was just published, touting the appellate process and "peer
disapproval" as "fundamental checks," and the House Judiciary
Committee as a proper recipient for complaints, with investigative
capacity.
At
that point, the National Commission was defunct. So we wrote
to the House Judiciary Committee, asking that it clarify what it
does with the judicial misconduct complaints it receives. If
it was not investigating them, why did the Commission's report not
say that? For nearly two full years, the House Judiciary
Committee ignored all our many follow-up letters and phone
calls. Finally in June 1995, successor counsel reiterated that
the House Judiciary Committee does not investigate complaints of
judicial conduct filed with it, but confines itself to
legislation. He explained that the Committee simply doesn't
have the budget for investigations. The Committee might have
had the money of the commission's report had been more forthright,
rather than dodging the issue with a vague recommendation that the
House "ensure that its Committee on the Judiciary has the resources
to deal with judicial discipline matters."
According to the Commission's report, the standard
practice of the House Judiciary committee is to direct complainants'
attention to the 1980 Act. It cautioned the Committee to "tell
complainants that the 1980 Act does not contemplate sanctions for
judges' decisions or issues relating to the merits of
litigation." Since the House Judiciary Committee had not
directed us to file a complaint under the 1980 Act, we asked it
whether this meant that it did not believe our complaint was
reviewable under the Act. But the Committee, like the National
Commission before it, would not tell us. Ultimately, it became
obvious that it had not the foggiest idea. And, again,the
reason is attributable to the Commission's report which is wholly
uninformative on the subject of "merits
relatedness."
Meanwhile, our growing expertise and persistence paid
off with the House Judiciary Committee. In February 1996, its
counsel met with us and agreed that if the federal judiciary
rejected our complaint as "merits-related," the House Judiciary
Committee would have to undertake an investigation. So we
filed our complaint.
What happened? Our complaint was improperly
dumped as "merits-related" in an order which itself was a prime
example of a dishonest decision. For this reason, we sought
review by the Circuit Council. Our petition demonstrated that
the dismissal order was legally and factually insupportable and that
contemptuously disregarded the National Commission's recommendation
that dismissal orders be reasoned and nonconclusory and that the
circuits resolve ambiguity in the interpretation of the 1980
Act. We pointed out that the Judicial Conference had endorsed
each of these recommendations and that our complaint was ideally
suited for building interpretive precedent to make clear, once and
for all, that complaints alleging biased, bad-faith conduct are not
"merits-related," and additionally that even "merits-related"
complaints are not required to be dismissed under the statute.
The Circuit Council's response? It denied our petition in one
sentence. The cover letter informed us that, under the Act,
there was no further review.
But the Judicial Conference has oversight
responsibility - and we turned to it. The Assistant General
Counsel to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts is the
liaison to the Judicial Conference's disciplinary committee.
His refusal to take any steps on our documented showing that the
circuit is subverting the Act and the recommendations of the
National Commission and Judicial Conference bears directly on the
integrity of the National Commission's review of subsec. 372(c)
complaints, since he was one of the two court-connected researchers
who examined those complaints for the National Commission. He
was not Assistant General Counsel at the time he examined complaints
for the commission. He was promoted to that position
afterwards, presumably because the federal judiciary liked his
conclusions so well.
In
the end, we have empirically proven more than the "inadequacy of the
1980 Act" resulting from an over-expansive judicial interpretation
of "merits-relatedness." We have demonstrated that the 1980
Act is a facade behind which the federal judiciary dismisses
fully-documented complaints of dishonest judicial decisions by
decisions which are themselves dishonest and which, properly, should
be the subject of disciplinary review - if there were any place to
go for redress.
That's yet another reason why we are trying again
with the House Judiciary Committee. We are now preparing a
formal presentation to it based on our subsec. 372(c) complaint, as
well as the subsec. 372(c) complaints of our members. These,
likewise, have been dishonestly dismissed as "merits related" in
conclusory orders which similarly misrepresent the serious
misconduct issues presented. Based on this evidence, and the
first-hand testimony of people who have brought complaints, the
House Judiciary Committee will get a good look at what the federal
judiciary, working through the National Commission, did not want it
to see: flagrant judicial misconduct and corruption which the
federal judiciary was able to cover-up when it made subsec. 372(c)
complaints confidential. We believe it will be the basis for
ending that confidentiality and for creating an alternative
disciplinary mechanism, one outside the federal judiciary, to review
judicial misconduct.
References
(1) Anthony D'Amato, "The Ultimate Injustice.
When the Court Misstates the Facts," Cordozo Law Review,
11:1313 (1989).
(2) Research Papers of the National Commission on
Judicial Discipline and Removal, Vol. I,
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