I, Thomas M. Read, being over the age of 21, at all times mentioned here a resident of the State of Connecticut and a citizen of the United States, being familiar with sanctity of an oath, do hereby swear to the truth of that which I declare in this document.  The purpose of this Declaration is not to argue facts, not to argue law.  The purpose is to present facts which are backed up by documentation in my possession that frame the events that guided my actions, and to present questions relating to such facts that form the basis for my efforts to obtain repair under the law for damages that my family has sustained, as follows:

1.  For the past 19 years my wife and I have been subjected to damaging acts by individuals claiming to have federal authority to act in such manner as to usurp and destroy my individual property rights and common law rights to redress that are otherwise enjoyed by all other citizens of the State of Connecticut and the United States, and which rights are protected by several federal laws and multiple provisions of the Constitution of the United States.  We have never been repaired for the damages done to us, nor allowed to bring our entire case to court, even though we prevailed and obtained judgment against the federal actors in their action against us.

2.  My wife and I were sued for many years by federal court appointees from the State of California upon claims that were proved at trial to be utterly false, fraudulent, and found by a jury to have been known by the perpetrators to have been such prior to filing said claims.  The claims against us alleged an obligation to pay "rents or use in occupancy" in an amount far in excess of that we had agreed to pay - and which agreed upon amount was initially offered to us.  We had been fraudulently induced into "renting" the property while awaiting closing upon a sale, as a means of entrapment in a bankruptcy scam.  Those suing us were California bankruptcy court appointees whose custom it was to use the federal bankruptcy system for purposes of unlawful self-enrichment.  The trustee involved against us as plaintiff, was jailed in 1990 for bankruptcy crimes prescribed by the U.S. Congress for his manner of deceits.

3.  The suits against us were brought under color of Connecticut State law regulating property rights.  The first suit was in the Northern California bankruptcy court.  The second suit was in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut after venue had been transferred from California to Connecticut.  The action in Connecticut bankruptcy court was dismissed upon a non-reviewable order for federal abstention in 1982.  In 1983, an action was commenced in a Connecticut Superior Court.  Each action contained the same false allegations against us, except that the amount demanded diminished as we discovered and exposed a stronger paper trail revealing the fraud being perpetrated against us.  The suits against us finally ceased with a trial and judgment against a California bankruptcy trustee in October of 1986.  But, the six years of litigation had caused severe damages to our private property, and to our reputations.

4.  The Connecticut court was concerned about the use of its jurisdiction by the California bankruptcy trustee, and our recovery options upon our counterclaims if we prevailed at trial.  It ordered upon our motion that the trustee to appear in his case against us "for purposes of [our] counterclaims", or the case against us in Connecticut courts would be dismissed.  The California bankruptcy trustee ultimately filed his appearance rather than leave us alone, and the matter continued to trial.

5.  In late 1986, a jury trial in Connecticut Superior Court revealed the fraud planned and executed against us by the federal actors, and judgment was found in our favor.  At no time prior to, or during, the jury trial did the California based federal actors ever assert any authority or standing that was above the laws of the State of Connecticut upon the issues tried.  That is to say, there was never asserted any characteristic of the California bankruptcy trustee that distinguished himself from any other manner of trustee bringing a case to trial in Connecticut's courts, nor were any federal issues raised.

6.  In late 1987, we sought to enforce the damages award provisions of our judgment against the named judgment debtor, Trustee Charles Duck, by filing our Connecticut judgment in the courts of the State of California where Duck lived, pursuant to Art. IV, U.S. Const., Full Faith and Credit between sister states; California law; and the common law of fiduciary liability for damages resulting from tortious acts, as apply to trustee personal liability in both the State of Connecticut and the State of California.

7.  In March of 1988, Duck, having submitted a motion to vacate, argued that title 11 of the U.S. Code, at Sec. 727(1), prohibited enforcement of our judgment against a bankruptcy trustee.  This argument had never been raised in Connecticut.  Duck's attorney specifically asserted to the California sister state action that,

"I suggest not to rule in [Read's] favor because the [bankruptcy] discharge says you [the California Judge in the sister state action] are prohibited.  You [the Judge] are permanently enjoined from taking any steps to enforce any discharged judgment.  That is what this discharge paper says and recording an abstract is taking steps and I am afraid Mr. Read would be in contempt of the bankruptcy court if he did that."

The above statement was utterly false, and was intended as a threat to the California judge and a threat to me that there would be federal reprisal if the Municipal Court for the County of Sonoma, California, actually gave our judgment the Full Faith and Credit that is required by Article Four of the U.S. Constitution.  This federal court appointed attorney had already frightened off some months before a California attorney that I had hired and paid to represent us.  I have my attorney's letter advising me of the threat, and a copy of the federal appointed attorney's threatening letter to my California attorney.

8.  Unknown to us because we were not noticed as required by bankruptcy law relating to notification of parties in interest, Duck was separately filing papers in the Northern California bankruptcy system to re-open the long closed bankruptcy case to which he had been appointed trustee and brought the fraudulent suit against us, and he was doing so in order to affect a "removal to federal bankruptcy court of the case which had 18 months prior gone to final judgment in Connecticut.  It is important to state here the premise and procedure upon which a removal may be obtained.  In 1988, the statutory and procedural authority for removing a civil case from a State Court of competent jurisdiction, are as follows:

STATUTORY AUTHORITY

28 U.S.C. SUBSEC 1452.  REMOVAL OF CLAIMS RELATED TO BANKRUPTCY CASES:

(a) A party may remove any claim or cause of action in a civil action other than a proceeding before the United States Tax Court or a civil action by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power, to the district where such civil action is pending, if such district court has jurisdiction of such claim or cause of action under section 1334 of this title.

(b) The court to which such claim or cause of action is removed may remand such claim or cause of action on any equitable ground.  An order entered under this subsection remanding a claim or cause of action or a decision to not remand, is not reviewable by appeal or otherwise.

RULES GOVERNING

BANKRUPTCY RULE 9027.  REMOVAL: 

(a) Application.

(1) Where filed; Form and Content.  An application for removal shall be filed with the clerk for the district and division within which is located the state or federal court where the civil action is pending.  The application shall be verified and contain a short and plain statement of the facts which entitle the applicant to remove and be accompanied by a copy of all process and pleadings.

(2) Time for Filing; Civil Action Initiated Before Commencement of the Case Under the Code.  [Not Applicable]

(3) Time for filing; Civil Action Initiated After Commencement of the Case Under the Code.  If a case under the Code is pending when a claim or cause of action is asserted in another court, an application for removal may be filed with the clerk only within the shorter of (A) 30 days after receipt, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim or cause of action sought to be removed or (B) 30 days after receipt of the summons if the initial pleading has been filed with the court but not served with the summons.

(b) Bond.  An application for removal, except when the applicant is the trustee, debtor, debtor in possession, or the United States shall be accompanied by a bond with good and sufficient surety conditioned that the party will pay all costs and disbursements incurred by reason of the removal should it be determined that the claim or cause of action was not removable or was improperly removed.

(c) Notice. Promptly after filing the application and the bond, if required, the applicant shall serve a copy of the application on all parties to the removed claim or cause of action.

(d) Filing in Non-bankruptcy Court.  Promptly after filing the application and bond, if any, the applicant shall file a copy of the application with the clerk of the court from which the claim or cause of action is removed.  Removal of the claim or cause of action is effected on such filing of a copy of the application.  The parties shall proceed no further in that court unless and until the claim or cause of action is remanded.

(e) Remand. [Not Applicable in this matter for the reason that the California bankruptcy court did not possess any possible provision of law or rules to obtain jurisdiction over any aspect of enforcement of our judgment against its trustee personally, nor any further action relating to malicious prosecution that related to the fraud adjudicated by the Connecticut jury.]

9.  The facts relating to our matters of execution of our judgment against Mr. Duck, personally, were that:

(a)  Duck's suit against us in Connecticut had gone to trial and judgment on October 21, 1986. 

(b) Duck did not appeal the judgment under Connecticut law against him.

(c) Under Connecticut law, and the common law, trustees ARE suable and ARE personally liable for tort judgments against them when their acts are necessarily known to them to have been tortious.  Bankruptcy trustees are similarly liable, personally, for their deliberate misfeasances and/or malfeasances under federal law.

(d) None of the claims in the suit tried in Connecticut contained any element that even remotely related to an authority granted to any branch of the U.S. Government by the Constitution of the United States, nor any federal statutes.  All claims asserted arose either under Connecticut statutory or common law, or both.

(e) None of the common law causes of action acquired by my wife and me for repair to us for the damages done by Duck's pursuit of unlawful claims contained any element that even remotely related to an issue arising under the U.S. Constitution, nor any federal statute which includes each and every aspect of Title 11 (Bankruptcy Code).

(f) On February 18, 1987, our judgment against Duck became final without opportunity to reopen (four months after trial under Connecticut law).  That even severed any connection between me and my wife and the federal bankruptcy system in Northern California.  To this date, we do not understand how federal actors may damage citizens that had no connection with a federal matter, and then walk away from a state court judgment without accountability to the laws they violated as determined by the state forum that they sought to perpetrate their adjudicated fraud.

(g) Our California state court enforcement action, filed in December of 1987, against Duck was an action against him personally under Connecticut State law and the common law of fiduciary liability for tort offenses.  The jury at trial in Connecticut was advised of his culpability in bringing the suit as if he were the actual perpetrator of the offenses we had claimed against him when trial commenced, and no object or exception was made by Mr. Duck or his attorney to that description of his culpability at any time during the suit.

(h) No part of title 11 has any statutory provision that sets a "bankruptcy trustee" apart from any other manner of "trustee" under state law, and Duck made no such distinction in the Connecticut case that he filed against us.  Congress has expressly forbidden Article I bankruptcy judges from appointing a "Receiver" (See:  11 U.S.C. Sec. 105(b)), and the congressional record is clear that the duties of the trustee are strictly administrative, and not judicial.  Likewise, the law and record are clear that a bankruptcy judge's duties are exclusively judicial, and not in any regard administrative.  (Authorities happily presented upon request.)

(i) No aspect of the U.S. Constitution, nor any federal statute, empowers the federal judiciary, nor any other branch of government, to knowingly file, or authorize the filing of, meritless suits for purposes of pressuring innocent persons to pay sums that they do not owe.

QUESTIONS 1 AND 2:

1.  Upon the facts contained in 9(a) through 9(i) above, it is reasonable to question:  Did Duck intend at all times to retreat to the safe haven of his appointing federal court from the outset of commencing his litigation against us in Connecticut State court?

2.  What federal authority could possibly exist in March of 1988 that would be found to create the jurisdiction of a federal court over an action against an entity whose adjudicated conduct is condemned against his person under common law, and whose person is not otherwise shielded under any Act of Congress for the conduct that a jury found him liable for civil damages?

10.  Removal procedures under federal law are not available to plaintiffs.  The plaintiff chooses the forum to bring his suit, and lacks standing to remove any aspect falling under his chosen court's jurisdiction to federal court - particularly when the object of his effort is to circumvent the course of justice from his chosen forum.  Removal is an option of a defendant upon showing of just cause (such as pendant federal jurisdiction).  Duck was the plaintiff in the action in Connecticut, and he was the plaintiff/judgment debtor in the sister state action in California to enforce the judgment against him.  Jurisdiction is at all times then and now remains vested with the State of Connecticut under Connecticut law.  I possess authority from federal decisions that declare plaintiffs are not granted powers under federal law to remove cases to federal courts after failing to prevail upon the case they brought to the forum they have chosen.  Removal is a defendant's prerogative only when a federal issue exists prior to trial in a State court, and only in accordance with federal rules of procedure.  One of my authorities declares that the removal provisions of federal law are not a license for the trustee to engage in privateering conduct under the guise of case administration.  Such, in fact was the case involving us.

11.  On or about July 10, 1988, I received a one page notice by the California bankruptcy court appointing Duck, that there was scheduled to be a 'NOTICE OF HEARING ON APPLICATION FOR REMOVAL AND FOR STATUS CONFERENCE", on July 15, 1998.

12.  I immediately called the Northern California Bankruptcy Court, and I inquired about the nature of this hearing and status conference.  I was referred to the bankruptcy judge's law clerk that I need not attend the matter.  I was suspicious that that was not correct, and that I should be there since it regarded my pending enforcement matters in the California Municipal Court.

13.  I was not sent a copy of an "Application for Removal", as required by Bankruptcy Rule 9027(c), nor was the Municipal Court for the County of Sonoma (where the sister state action was pending) supplied an Application for removal, as required by Bankruptcy Rule 9027(d) (NOTE:  Bankruptcy Rule 9027(d) states that the court where an action is pending must be served a copy of an Application for Removal, and that "removal of the claim or cause of action is effected on such filing of a copy of the application."  Conversely, any removal attempted without the requisite filing of an Application for Removal is not "effected".  The case in state court is not removed.

14.  Even if there had been such sent, the time limits for removal imposed by Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a)(3) (as may apply to civil actions commenced after the filing of a petition under Chapter 11) would have expired years prior to the enforcement action pending in California - if Duck had been the captioned defendant possessed of the legal prerogative to remove a case to a federal forum.

15.  Nor could the California enforcement action itself have been removed for the same reasons.  The enforcement action had been filed in December of 1987, and the hearing in the California court upon Mr. Duck's motion to vacate took place in April of 1988.  The advisory committee note upon Bkcy Rule 9027 regarding the subject of timeliness states:  "Subdivisions (a)(2) and (a)(3) [of B.R. 9027] are derived from paragraphs one and two of 28 U.S.C. subsec. 1446(b) [repealed in 1984].  Timely exercise of the right to remove is as important in bankruptcy cases as in removals from a state court to a district court."  The attempted removal of the enforcement action was June 30, 1988.  This attempt was several months too late to have arguably been legitimate.

16.  On July 15, 1988, I attended the noticed "HEARING ON APPLICATION FOR REMOVAL AND FOR STATUS CONFERENCE".  I arrived at the court building early, and immediately went to the Office of the Clerk.  There I purchased the papers in the Jacksen bankruptcy file that related to Duck's administration of the Jansen bankruptcy case.  Within those papers I discovered a copy of the "Application for Removal" that I'd never been sent, nor had I previously otherwise ever seen.  I did not have any knowledge of what may have been represented to the California bankruptcy court, but I saw several statements within the 'Application' that were untrue.  I was unprepared to deal with any substantive issues that were untried in Connecticut.

17.  I then attended the so-called "HEARING" at the appointed time.  This "HEARING" has subsequently become referred to as "Trial" by all federal courts.

18.  The "HEARING" was conducted in open court amongst other matters scheduled for the day.  The court instructed me to "have a seat", while he queried Duck's attorney.

19.  The judge first asked Duck's attorney whether the judgment arose out of a "...lawsuit which was commenced before the bankruptcy?"  The answer given was, "Yes, the litigation was pending at the time of bankruptcy."   That was a FALSE statement.  Both the issues tried and the first of the many suits were "commenced" well after the debtors bankruptcy petition had been filed, and did not involve any aspect of pre-petition relationship between the debtors, as individuals, and my family, as private parties.

20.  The judge followed up with his next question, "... what was the nature of the cross-complaint?"  Duck's attorney stammered a bit, and then declared "... I can't really explain to you what the nature of the cross-complaint was other than an affirmative judgment was entered against Mr. Duck as trustee in the sum of $10,000."

21.  Had Duck's attorney stopped there, his statement would have been true.  But, he didn't stop.  He further declared, "I don't know what the nature of it was, but it was - it was a claim that Mr. Read had - Mr. and Mrs. Read had in the bankruptcy."  That statement was utterly false.  Moreover, the records of a bankruptcy case are there for all to refer to, and the record of the Jacksen case (the case at issue) was clear to the point that we did not have a claim against the estate.  In actual fact, the ONLY relationship between the Jacksen estate, its trustee, its "debtor in possession", its judge(s), its court appointed attorneys, and its clerks, was the willful fraud perpetrated against us for over six years until judgment after a trial upon the merits of the fraudulent claims against us.

22.  Duck's attorney concluded by declaring, "...I filed a motion to vacate that [Read's sister state action] on the grounds that the claim arose at least between the time of the initial filing and the conversion."  ("conversion" refers to conversion from a Chapter 11 reorganization case, to a Chapter 7 liquidation case).  This restatement of the timing of the issues gone to trial was correct.  Additionally, it is a significant fact in these matters that the Chapter 11 "reorganization" case had only one asset.  That asset was a "contingent claim" that was knowingly and fraudulently listed as against us that appeared for the first time upon the debtors schedules at the time of conversion from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7 - FOUR AND ONE HALF YEARS AFTER THE CASE WAS FILED.  The only "contingency" that existed in favor of the estate was that we would either capitulate in settlement, or that the trustee would prevail at trial in Connecticut.  Ultimately, neither event transpired.

23.  At that point the court addressed the response of Mr. Duck's attorney by stating, "That's the problem I have.  I do not see that as relevant in the slightest, nor do I see the discharge as being relevant in the slightest.  The discharge is something that protects the Debtor; it doesn't protect the trustee or the estate.  It's irrelevant to the Trustee or the estate."  That operation of law should have been the conclusive point to the so-called "HEARING" before that bankruptcy judge in that bankruptcy court.  Not only had the procedural requirements of Bkcy Rule 9027 been ignored, but Duck's argument for federal jurisdiction was without merit.  But, like Mr. Duck's attorney, the bankruptcy judge didn't stop there.  He continued by stating, "The SOLE ISSUE here is whether or not that this is a judgment against the Trustee individually or in his capacity - his representative capacity insofar as doing his job in representing the estate."  (Emphasis added.)  In actual fact, there was no "issue" before that bankruptcy court.

24.  The bankruptcy judge then concluded with Mr. Duck's attorney by stating,  "It's a perfectly valid judgment.  The ONLY QUESTION is whether it's enforceable against Mr. Duck personally or just against the bankruptcy estate." (Emphasis added.)  In fact, I was not attempting to enforce the judgment against the estate.  I was in the lawful process of enforcing the judgment against the federal court appointed trustee, personally.  Long-standing federal caselaw of the district within which the trial court sits forbids a trustee from charging the estate with payment of obligations incurred from meritless administrative conduct.  The bankruptcy trustee was the exclusive culpable party for execution of our judgment against him for fraud.

QUESTIONS 3 - 15:

3.  The bankruptcy judge declared, "The sole issue" - what issue?

4.  If there were any "issue" relating to "whether [our judgment was] enforceable against Mr. Duck personally, then why didn't Duck raise that "issue" in the Connecticut court which at the time possessed SOLE jurisdiction, and where he was liable under common law, and the statutory law of the state forum that he chose to impose his fraud upon us?

5.  Did some new "issue" arise after the trial was completed and the judgment became final?

6.  If it did, it didn't seem to have arisen under title 11, because, as the judge in California correctly stated, "...it [the discharge] doesn't protect the Trustee or the estate."  Whose fraud was it?

7.  Is a "representative of the estate" representing the estate when he knows, or could known and by federal law should know, that his conduct is unlawful under both federal and state law, and he further well knows that if successful in his conduct, the funds derived would accrue to the personal benefit of himself and his employees, and not to the benefit of the estate?

8.  The bankruptcy judge declared there to be a "question ... whether [our judgment was] enforceable against Mr. Duck...".  Who brought that "question", and why wasn't that person brought as an expert witness, or intervened as a party to bring the "question" up in the action in Connecticut"?

9.  The State of Connecticut claims jurisdiction over all of its judgments for a period of twenty years after they become final.  What federal authority allows a bankruptcy judge 3000 miles from the court of competent jurisdiction to usurp Connecticut's statutory jurisdiction?

10.  When did the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California obtain the federal question jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit brought against us by its trustee, and what federal statutory authority allowed such alleged jurisdiction?

11.  What was the federal question arising under 28 U.S.C. subsec 1334 pending in a "civil action" in Northern California that would not have been both resolved and precluded by operation of 28 U.S.C. subsec 1738, Full Faith and Credit in concert with 28 U.S.C. subsec 1652, State laws as rules of decision?

12.  Where is there located a clear statutory authority from the U.S. Congress that authorizes an intervening federal bankruptcy court to exercise judicial power to ITSELF create the very question that it then uses as premise for an order to invoke its jurisdiction, and summarily wipe out a jury verdict from a State court of competent jurisdiction that is located in a different State within a different federal judicial circuit 3000 miles away?

13.  Upon what existing premise does a federal bankruptcy court hold to presume a 'federal' power to redirect the lawful course of civil justice from the court conducting the trial and reaching final judgment, as prescribed by the laws of a State, and under which laws the issues tried in that State court arose?

14.  What bearing does 28 U.S.C. subsec 1738, Full Faith and Credit have upon a U.S. Bankruptcy Court's consideration of a final judgment from a State Court?

15.  What bearing does 28 U.S.C. subsec 1652, State Laws as Rules of Decision, have upon a U.S. Bankruptcy Court's consideration of a final judgment from a State Court?

25.  The California bankruptcy judge began to query me upon the nature of the counterclaims, and then to actually ARGUE WITH ME about the existence of procedural facts that were a matter of record in the Connecticut case.   The entire proceeding in the California bankruptcy court was confrontational and hostile against me!  The judge was rude and belligerent, and at no time acknowledged the jury finding that the claims brought against me had been adjudicated false and fraudulent ("false and fraudulent" means:  Mr. Duck knowingly lied in his claims against us in Connecticut Superior Court.)

26.  At one point I expressed by frustration at what was going on by complaining that "I've just spent $13.50 to get copies of documents that Mr. Arnot [Duck's attorney in California] has filed in this court since April 25th that I haven't had at all...".  Further on I declared, "It's very difficult to respond to matters when you don't know what you're responding to...".  But, ultimately the bankruptcy court judge declared, "So the decision I have regard - THE DECISION I MAKE REGARDLESS OF HOW YOU - REGARDLESS OF HOW IT GOT TO ME is a decision on the extent to which you can enforce that judgment."  And, further on he states, "The only thing that I'm assuming - now, look.  If you have a beef against Mr. Duck for something he did to you, you can - I'm not telling you how to do it.  I have no idea how to do it, but that's not what's in front of me here.  The only thing - well THE ONLY THING THAT'S IN FRONT OF ME NOW IS THE ISSUE OF THE ENFORCEABILITY OF THAT JUDGMENT.  You got a judgment, and nobody's saying it's not a valid judgment in terms of the Court shouldn't issue it, and it's not a question of the debt being discharged.  THAT'S A TOTAL RED HERRING.  The issue is:  Having gotten that judgment, what can you do with it?  Because the judgment is a judgment against a bankruptcy trustee, IT IS UP TO ME TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT THAT IS THE TYPE OF JUDGMENT THAT YOU MAY PURSUE MR. DUCK, PERSONALLY, FOR."  (Emphasis added.)

QUESTIONS 16 - 24:

16.  Again - why weren't all "ISSUES" resolved by the Connecticut Superior Court under Connecticut Law?

17.  How is it that a federal bankruptcy court in California obtains any authority independent of Connecticut law to "determine the enforceability" of a judgment that unquestionably has NOT BEEN REMOVED from the 20 year post judgment statutory jurisdiction of the Connecticut court rendering it?

18.  From what source of power does any federal judge presume to possess authority to "... decided whether or not this is the type of judgment..." that one may pursue a trustee personally for, when the same judge ignores what the judgment declares upon its face?

19.  Does Art. I of the U.S. Constitution bestow upon the U.S. Congress the power to create an entity such as a "bankruptcy trustee" that is not the same as an ordinary trustee, as a party in a suit proceeding in a State Court (under common law, trustees are always personally liable for damages resulting from their own tortious conduct, as in this case)?

20.  If so, where is that provision of Article I found?  I've read Article I, and mindful of the due process provisions of the Fifth Amendment long held to limit congressional bankruptcy powers found in Art. I, Sec. 8, Cl. 4, of the Constitution of the United States, there seems to be no such power at all.

21.  If the U.S. Congress were possessed with such a power, wouldn't it have reduced that understanding to wording within its many bankruptcy Acts?

22.  Where is the statutory language that creates a "Super Trustee", that is not liable for a tort-judgment offense that he voluntarily presented himself to be accountable for in order to maintain his fraudulent suit in the forum of his choosing?

23.  "So the decision I have regard - THE DECISION I MAKE REGARDLESS OF HOW YOU - REGARDLESS OF HOW IT GOT TO ME is a decision on the extent to which you can enforce that judgment."  Why does not it matter "how" an enforcement action that was not lawfully removable from a State court "got" to a federal bankruptcy judge?  Does not the plainly stated language of Bankruptcy Rule 9027(d) absolutely and without exception, require than an application for removal be filed in the State court where the action is pending before the bankruptcy court may presume any "removal" has transpired, or any federal judicial authority exists to decide anything?

24.  Must not the timeliness requirements of Bankruptcy Rule 9027 be met in order for a federal bankruptcy court to commit any act under federal authority involving proceedings ongoing in a State forum that do not involve either the debtor or the debtor's estate?

27.  I left the hearing after leaving the substantive papers from the Connecticut proceedings with the Clerk.  The following day, July 16, 1988, the California bankruptcy judge filed a Memorandum of Decision, and also filed a "Permanent Injunction" against my wife and me, that were entered by the Clerk on July 18, 1988, in the docket of the Jacksen Bankruptcy Case.  He made no reference to the documents that I'd left.

28.  In his "Memorandum of Decision, the California bankruptcy judge wrote the following three paragraphs in conclusion:

"In this case Mr. Duck was authorized by Bankruptcy Rule 6009 to appear in the Connecticut litigation.  The law, as laid down by this nation's highest Court, is that where the trustee's acts are authorized any judgment taken against him is not enforceable against him personally.  This Court must therefore rule in favor of Mr. Duck.

"It is doubtful that the Reads can recover anything on their judgment at this point, as the bankruptcy case has been closed; this is a matter in which the Reads need expert advice.  Regardless of whether recovery is possible, the only permissible source of recovery is the bankruptcy estate, over which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1334(a).  Accordingly, no action may be taken by the Reads anywhere but in this Court to enforce their judgment.

"Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9021, a separate judgment will be entered permanently barring the Reads from enforcing the judgment against Mr. Duck personally or proceeding to enforce the judgment in any way in any court other than this court." 

29.  The questions immediately following are limited to the statements and alleged written authorities declared by the California bankruptcy court in its Memorandum.  For the Reader's benefit, the full text of the bankruptcy judge's above-cited statute and Bankruptcy Rules are reproduced below.

Bkr Rule 6009.  PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF PROCEEDINGS BY TRUSTEE OR DEBTOR IN POSSESSION.

With or without court approval, the trustee or debtor in possession may prosecute or may enter an appearance and defend any pending action or proceeding by or against the debtor, or commence and prosecute any action or proceeding in behalf of the estate before any tribunal.

Bkr Rule 9021.  ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Except as otherwise provided herein, Rule 58 F.R.C.P. applies in cases under the Code.  Every judgment entered in an adversary proceeding or contested matter shall be set forth on a separate document.  A judgment is effective when entered as provided in Rule 5003.  The reference in Rule 58 FRCP to Rule 79(a) FRCP shall be read as a reference to Rule 5003 of these rules.

28 U.S.C. subsec 1334.  BANKRUPTCY CASES AND PROCEEDINGS.

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases under title 11.

Additionally, I'm including the relevant portions of the statute that is the source of Rule writing authority to the U.S. Supreme Court:

28 U.S.C. subsec 2075.  BANKRUPTCY RULES

The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in cases under title 11.

Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.

QUESTIONS 25 - 46:

25.  Mindful of the adjudicated false and fraudulent claims that both Mr. Jacksen (the debtor in possession) and Mr. Duck were found to have declared upon their Complaint as basis for the lawsuits in California and Connecticut that they each brought against us, and the restrictions against abridgment, enlargement, or modification of "any substantive right", declared in 28 U.S.C. subsec 2075, the congressional empowerment statute to write the Bankruptcy Rules; just what portion of Bkr. Rule 6009 imputes a federal power that may "authorize" a bankruptcy trustee or a debtor in possession to knowingly file false and fraudulent claims in a civil case in a State's courts, regarding issues arising under that same State's laws?

26.  When an "act" committed by a trustee or debtor in possession is itself actionable under the laws of a State because it violates the "substantive" rights of innocent persons against whom the trustee or debtor in possession have acted, would not this rule be considered not to "authorize" such conduct?

27.  Are not the rights and powers of the trustee and debtor in possession in bankruptcy acting under the laws and within the courts of a State, limited to those rights and powers availed to an ordinary entity engaged in a similar pursuit with a similar object in mind?  No more, and no less?

28.  Doesn't the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit the U.S. Congress from granting powers to Article III courts, and Article I bankruptcy courts, that could be construed to "authorize" knowledgeable and willful false and fraudulent claims in a State court in order to unjustly enrich themselves through a guise of "estate administration"?

29.  The California bankruptcy court declared "[t]he law, as laid down by this nation's highest Court, is that where the trustee's acts are authorized any judgment taken against him is not enforceable against him personally."  When did the U.S. Supreme Court acquire the authority under our U.S. Constitution to legislate away my vested rights?

30.  I am not aware of any constitutional authority that allows the U.S. Supreme Court to "lay down" any law, particularly when such a law would controvert the common law of fiduciary liability for tort offenses.  What change to our founding document has muddied the line between the legislative and the judicial grants of power contained in Article I and Article III of the U.S. Constitution?

31. Then the California bankruptcy court declared that "[t]his Court must therefore rule in favor of Mr. Duck."   When did "this Court" ever lawfully acquire any jurisdiction to "rule" anything regarding our action to execute our judgment against Mr. Duck?

32.  In the following paragraph, the bankruptcy court opined the doubtful condition that we could "recover anything on [our]... judgment, as the bankruptcy case has been closed."  What relevance did the closure of a bankruptcy case to which we were not involved, except by fraudulent implications by a trustee and debtor in possession, have upon the execution of our judgment under State law from the State in which it was entered?

33.  The California bankruptcy court stated that, "...the only permissible source of recovery is the bankruptcy estate, over which this Court exercises exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1334(a)."  Notwithstanding the undisputed authority that the district court obtains under 28 U.S.C. subsec 1334 regarding actions against bankruptcy estates, how may an estate obtain liability for a final judgment against a trustee based upon a jury verdict finding willful fraud, when under title 11 such manner of conduct is an exception of the discharge provisions of title 11 to the benefit of the debtor (See:  11 U.S.C. subsec 523(a)(2), (4) and (6))?

34.  Wouldn't the creditors be able to sue the trustee for squandering away their entitled benefits?

35.  If our judgment (as the bankruptcy judge declared) was arguably against the estate, wouldn't we then be creditors able to apply our judgment against the trustee (personally) for his willful abrogation of fiduciary duty damaging our vested rights to property and reputation?

36.  Isn't that why the U.S. Congress has required the trustee to take out a bond, and further required the U.S. Trustee to approve the level of that bond (Ref.:  11 U.S.C. subsec 322)?

37.  While upon this subject of a bond, it happens that the language specified at 11 U.S.C. subsec 322, Qualification of trustee, in relevant terms to this Declaration, is "(a)... a person ... qualifies [as trustee] if before ... beginning official duties, such person has filed with the court a bond in favor of the United States conditioned on the faithful performance of such official duties.", and "(c) A trustee is not liable personally or on such trustee's bond in favor of the United Sates for any penalty or forfeiture incurred by the debtor."  What about the personal liability of a Chapter 7 trustee who is successor to a Chapter 11 debtor in possession, after volunteering his appearance in an unlawfully brought civil action "for purposes of counterclaims" that pre-existed his appearance in the case, and when the acts upon which liability against the trustee was found by a jury were post-petition acts (acts not committed by the debtor in his individual capacity) involving willful fraud?

38.  Why require a bond for "faithful performance of ... official duties" in favor of the United States, if all of the trustee's sins may be buried in a worthless estate?

39.  The California bankruptcy court then declared that "...no action may be taken by the Reads anywhere but in this Court to enforce their judgment."   When did the California bankruptcy court become a trial court in matters involving me and my wife?

40.  Where is our Summons from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California, for a new trial there?

41.  Where is a complaint against us from the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California, that clearly declares what the issue is?

42.  How does that California bankruptcy court obtain any authority under any provision of the U.S. Constitution, or any law made in pursuance therefore, to issue any orders regulating our actions that are altogether authorized by the laws of the State of Connecticut against an entity that is not a protectorate of the bankruptcy code?

43.  Is a federal bankruptcy court a manner of court of appeals over the judgments of State courts that have become final and unappealable under State law?

44.  Has the U.S. Congress over-ridden the common law of fiduciary liability, and successor fiduciary liability, with some statutory language of its own making?

45.  If so, what is that language, where may it be found, and upon what authority granted to the U.S. Congress under Article I of the Constitution of the United States could it have created such language?

46.  Lastly, the California bankruptcy court asserted that "[p]Uranus to Bankruptcy Rule 9021, a separate judgment [separate from a written "finding of facts and law"] will be entered permanently barring the Reads from enforcing the judgment against Mr. Duck personally or proceeding to enforce the judgment in any way in any court other than this court."  Where does Bkcy Rule 9021, or its parent Rule 58 F.R.C.P., authorize a "separate judgment" from an original judgment obtained from a jury proceeding in State court, and which "separate judgment" is in conflict with the findings of fact and law of the State conducting the trial?

30.  I timely appealed this order to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  There it sat for nearly 15 months before the BAP issued and published its decision.  During the meantime, several things were taking place in Northern California that were conclusive to our growing suspicions of corruption with the federal bankruptcy system in Northern California.

31.  In October of 1988, a U.S. Trustee was appointed for the first time to oversee bankruptcy administration in the District of Northern California.  The name of that U.S. Trustee was Anthony Sousa.  The U.S. Trustee Program was a product of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, and was further enabled through Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("BAFJA").  A principal purpose of the 1978 Act was to separate completely judicial administrative responsibilities.

32.  Under the Act, the federal office of "Bankruptcy Referee" was upgraded to "Bankruptcy Judge", and the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court (previously equity only) was expanded to equity and law.  Although the bankruptcy court was not allowed to conduct jury trials, it was granted plenary jurisdiction over contract, and certain other state law, issues that through proper procedures came under its jurisdiction. The Case Administration duties of the Referee were completely removed from the new post of Bankruptcy Judge.  The power for the bankruptcy court, or a bankruptcy judge, to appoint a "Receiver" was also removed by Congress.  Case administration duties were laden upon the panel of private trustees by statute.  Thus, the bankruptcy judge was (in theory) removed from administrative concerns over the outcomes of cases, and was to devote his time to encouraging parties to either work out lawful resolutions of cases, or bring any issues of law or in equity to the judge to decide for them.  No allowance was made by Congress for a bankruptcy judge to step in where no issue existed and obstruct the course of justice proceeding under the competent laws and judicial system of a State.

33.  The Office of U.S. Trustee was structured under the Department of Justice administration, and was required to receive and investigate complaints against panel trustees, and oversee certain newly prescribed reporting and performance requirements under the Reform Act and BAFJA.

34.  According to Mr. Sousa with whom I've had several discussions over the past ten years, a line of complainants formed complaining of Charles Duck's conduct on the very day that he opened his Office.  This was a surprise to him because he'd been told that Northern California was considered a model operation, and that there were no known problem areas.  This information was provided to him by the Department of Justice.  What has become quite evident over the intervening ten years since Sousa's appointment is that the DOJ, many judges on the bench, and likely all of the bankruptcy bar frequently practicing there, are directly responsible for the corruption will either become persuaded to turn their eyes the other way, or they will be attacked by those entrusted with insuring its integrity.

35.  By the Spring of 1989, Duck's antics under investigation by Sousa were making the newspapers.  I was mailed a copy of the San Jose Mercury News, that carried an article reporting the allegations of massive embezzlement of estate funds and assets, forging of papers (i.e., Duck was found to have 'typed-up' Bank Statements to include with his reports that served to conceal his embezzlements), he launched meritless suits in order to intimidate 'troublesome' creditors or debtors into submission, and alleged 'commingling of estate funds' into a single 'Trustee Account', where traceability of funds would be soon lost.

36.  In one Chapter 11 case, the creditors all banded together, hired an attorney to represent them, and this attorney attempted to affect a conversion of the Chapter 11 case to one under Chapter 7, in order to preserve the remaining assets of the case for the beneficiaries (by that time - just the creditors).  Duck vehemently opposed the conversion.  Bankruptcy law would require his replacement, and his embezzlements would become known.  The same bankruptcy judge who enjoined us, blocked the conversion for quite some time, and stated to news reporters of the efforts to stem Duck's looting that bankruptcy administration should be left to "more sophisticated minds".

37.  The attitude from the bench and bar of the bankruptcy system, and possibly the entire federal judiciary, is that those who patronize the right people are the "sophisticated minds" and all others are simply disgruntled miscreants who have no 'business sense'.  This is the artwork that bankruptcy practitioners paint for the public to view.  It is done to conceal far more sinister activity within the bankruptcy system.  In 1991, there was $26 billion in private wealth under the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy system nationwide.  Overseeing this wealth were 2,000 trustees.  But only about 200 were used as Chapter 11 or 12 trustees.  The rest were Chapter 7 and 13 trustees.  This means that the bulk of the assets are held in about 200 pair of hands.

38.  Duck had about 1500 active cases.  He was not filing reports on any but a handful where creditors were nagging the court for results.  He had divorced his first wife to marry his bookkeeper, Nancy, and Nancy was keeping both sets of books for Duck.  His attorney list was expansive, and he was known to take care of his attorneys well.  As I found out personally, no attorney in the area wanted to oppose Duck, because it would hurt his career - permanently!

39.  Who are the "right people" spoken of above?  They are a few very large and powerful law firms in the region with a thriving bankruptcy division.  From these firms come all the "nominations" for federal judgeship in bankruptcy.  The judicial selection process passes the duty of judicial selection to the Judicial Council for the respective circuit.  Those sitting on the Judicial Council, at least in the Ninth Circuit, have shown themselves to be willing to go to great lengths to quietly conceal any problems in federal bankruptcy courts from public view.  It doesn't look good for them to make mistakes.  They rely upon the nominator (law firms practicing in bankruptcy), and the DOJ to keep a lid on their mistakes.  So, the nominating law firms play several roles in keeping things under control.  From these firms come the well placed positions after 'one of their own' has served out his stint of contracted terms on the federal bench - and has well taken care of those who have put him/her there.  These same firms have close contacts at the highest levels of DOJ, and are called upon on occasion to take care of certain objectives funneled through the DOJ.

40.  Through the reporter involved, I made contact with citizens involved with the investigations of Duck, and I've maintained many of those contacts to this day.  I learned that Duck was only a kind of figurehead (even though he had sticky fingers with other people's money), but that a very long established tight group of attorneys (single attorney offices, as well as bankruptcy departments of larger firms) were committing fraud upon a massive scale against anyone not connected with their group. Chapter 11 (reorganization) and 12 (family farmer) cases were their principal prey.  One of the people that I met at that time was a Private Investigator.  He discovered that the bankruptcy judge (and prior Bankruptcy Referee) for Northern California from the mid-fifties until January of 1987, was an alcoholic.  His disability was so severe that in 1982 he was ordered by his superiors to take an extended vacation from the bench, and admitted himself to a local sanitarium to "dry out".  I have copies of the documents retained by the sanitarium that admitted him, and in his own handwriting this "order" was admitted.  I also have a report from a handwriting analyst that describes his degrading mental condition over several years based upon the degradation of his handwriting on official papers.  This disclosure is not made to denigrate this man.  It is made a part of my declaration in order that the reader may understand what is to follow because I fear without some understanding of the condition of the Northern California bankruptcy bench that had evolved by the 1980's, what I disclose below would sound like a pulp fiction novel.  It is all true, and it all relates in varying degrees to why we've been persecuted by the Department of Justice and federal courts ever since we prevailed against Duck's attempted extortion of us.

41.  First, I must report that the alcohol impaired bankruptcy judge, Conoley Brown (predecessor to the bankruptcy judge enjoining us from enforcing our judgment), was well regarded by those who knew him.  He was known to be a nice man who wished well to all before him.  He was also known to be particularly pleased at Christmas time, and on other special occasions, to receive gifts of liquor from his friends who practiced at the bar of his court.

42.  Over the course of time, the operation of the court fell into the hands of the very trustees and attorneys that did business in Judge Brown's court.  In fact, in late 1989, the FBI found Judge Brown's "signature stamp" in Duck's middle desk drawer!  Yes, evidence suggests that the man who was not at all bashful about creating Bank Statements on tissue paper, was also writing and issuing court orders on behalf of the often absent Judge Brown!  In fact, I have compelling evidence that he did so with the particular order allegedly authorizing his retention of counsel in Connecticut to sue us.

43.  Another count of impropriety was a letter that surfaced during the investigation of Duck, from a San Francisco attorney named Steven St. John, that instructed Duck how to go ahead and collect rents from a commercial building, stall its sale, and commingle the rents within his "Trustee's Account", in order to avoid reporting them as income to the estate.  Later, Duck and the attorney were to split the rents.

44.  The attorney representing Duck at the so-called "hearing" discussing the enforceability of our judgment against Duck, admitted in a published news article about Duck's illicit activities a year later that "40%" of his business was attributable to Duck.  One of the people that I met in California in 1989 had done some digging around in the County Clerk's office in Eureka, California, and had discovered that much of the Real Estate property that belonged to debtors in cases that Duck "administered" ultimately were purchased from the estate by that attorney's relatives in the Eureka area.  I have personally seen copies of many of these records, and they are presently outside the State of California in a secure location (not with me).

45.  During Duck's rapid unraveling under the scrutiny of the U.S. Trustee's Office, the bankruptcy judge issuing the injunction against us was very busy making public statements in support of Duck.  The judge is reported by News sources as lamenting the scrutiny under which Duck was being placed.  He declared that "trustees don't make that much (money), and if this pressure continues many may leave the profession".  It is important to note here that Mr. Sousa has personally told me that Duck is estimated to have embezzled from $40 million to $60 million (the news accounts estimated from $20 to $40 million, but Sousa confirmed the higher figure), from estates in his trusteeship during his 15 year "tenure" as a private trustee.  What he may (or may not) have lacked in legal fees, he'd more than made up for through fanciful bookkeeping.

46.  On September 25, 1989, Duck "plea-bargained" an admission of embezzlement of $1.9 million from two of 107 cases that were each one count against him.

47.  On September 27, 1989, the BAP entered its Opinion on our appeal.  Not only did the BAP affirm the bankruptcy court's injunction, but they declared that the bankruptcy court's order as one "... removing their litigation against the trustee from Connecticut state court to the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California."  This declaration is of particularly curious foundation under law, since there was no "litigation" in Connecticut.  The trial had taken place three years prior to the BAP opinion, and Mr. Duck had not taken an appeal from that judgment.  A 1993 check of the docket of that Connecticut case revealed no record of "removal" by the California bankruptcy court.  In short, the three judges impaled by the BAP had lied.

48.  Because of the above, I believe that part of Duck's plea-bargain agreement was to be provided federal protection from his common law liability to me and my wife.  I believe that is why the BAP decision was entered two days after Duck made the Plea Bargain agreement with the DOJ.  I believe this because of the BAP's blatant lie that a removal had been made from Connecticut Superior Court to a California federal bankruptcy court.  I possess conclusive PROOF that it had not ever been removed - this in addition to the final judgment after a jury trial.  I want to know the following:

a)  How may a law abiding citizen affirmatively protect himself when federal actor opponents are permitted to use our nation's courts for illicit purposes?

b)  How may we successfully be repaired for the damages done to us?

c)  How may we see to it that federal actor fraud is eliminated as a threat to any citizen engaged in lawful conduct in his or her private affairs?

49.  A Complaint of an effort to dismiss our claim against the United States under the taking clause of the U.S. Constitution, filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, on March 8, 1999, is being forwarded to several appropriate entities whose duty is to be concerned with the failure of federal courts to submit to the law, and the failure of federal judges to faithfully discharge their duties under their oath to support the Constitution of the United States.

50.  My objective is to be repaired.  I will do what is required to see to it that my family is repaired.  Federal courts are mistaken to believe that continued ad hominem attack upon me by denigrating my efforts to be repaired, and/or ignoring their duty to see justice done in our matter, is an effective means of frustrating this objective.  Federal judges have had an advantage over me thus far in that they have allowed themselves to lie to the record of our case, and I don't have that option.  I still retain a judgment after a jury trial against a federal court appointee for fraud, and I retain a common law cause in action against that same individual and others for their years and years of vexatious litigation against me and my family.  To whatever degree federal judges may have (as has been alleged) "authorized" the unlawful action against us; there was no federal jurisdiction over the proceedings in the Connecticut court where the jury trial took place, and the alleged federal judge authorization is immaterial under Connecticut law.

51.  Judge Thomas Thatcher reviewed complaints from two Bar Associations about corruption in New York City, during 1929.  He made the observation then that,

"Unless something can be done to restore to the practice in bankruptcy a more universal regard for professional standards changes in law and changes in procedure will accomplish little.  Judicial process works well enough with good men on the bench and at the bar, under almost any system.  But it will not work at all with incompetent or untrustworthy men either at the bar or on the bench, however perfect the laws may be."

52.  The situation in our federal courts seventy years later, in 1999, is just as bad as it was then - if not worse.  The men "at the bench and at the bar" that we have had the misfortune to encounter in our matters has been coddled by our federal judicial system thus far.  Their unlawful conduct has been knowingly allowed to flourish.  This Declaration is written to communicate only a part of the abuse that we have endured at the hands of federal judges after we proved to a jury that Duck and his cronies had lied upon their complaint against us, and had overtly attempted to use Connecticut's courts in their extortion scheme.

53.  In making this Declaration, I seek compensation from the United States for the manner of its operation of the bankruptcy system that has resulted in federal toleration of meritless suits against us, meritless defenses to our actions seeking repair, and federal toleration of our suffering a complete loss of our estate; and great damage to our personal and professional reputations.  Whether this complained of operation of the bankruptcy system is the result of the statutory language; the inability of appointed judges to prevent damages to innocent parties; or the incapability of the Department of Justice to monitor and control private trustees, debtors in possession, and their attorneys; is irrelevant to the issue of a federal taking.

54.  The bottom line to our claims is that - through a consistent pattern of lies and deceit - over our continued protests and beyond our control, federal court actors and officers have deliberately caused total destruction of our private fortunes over the past 19 years.  Their collective conduct sums up to a federal taking without payment of just compensation, whether or not their actions are/were authorized by law.  Our claims filed on March 8, 1999, for payment of just compensation for the ordeal that we have been subjected to since 1980, are made after exhaustion of all other remedies ordinarily availed to damaged persons with claims against suable entities.

Signed this 10th day of January, 2000, Thomas M. Read, Declarant

(1)  11 U.S.C. Sec. 727 protects the debtor in a Chapter 7 action from any liability for dischargeable debt that existed prior to entry of order for discharge.  Notwithstanding the fact that obligations accrued resulting from a debtor's participation in an adjudicated fraud are not subject to discharge (11 U.S.C. Sec. 727(4)(A), (B), (C), and possibly (D)), the judgment finally obtained was against the trustee for the estate - not the debtor.  Furthermore, the trustee was held personally responsible by the jury hearing the case for their determination that his personal absence from the proceedings was damning evidence against him upon an order of allowance from the judge presiding in the Connecticut Superior Court case.  This special allowance is known in Connecticut as a "Secondino Charge", and was ordered by the bench to the jury prior to their deliberations, but after we had shown that all concerned acting against us were well informed as a result of their official admissions of the fraud we had been subjected to.

WORKING TOGETHER TO ATTAIN FAIRNESS